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We use new firm-level data to examine the effects of firm divestitures and privati-
zation on corporate performance in a rapidly emerging market economy. Unlike
the existing literature, we control for accompanying ownership changes and the
fact that divestitures and ownership are potentially endogenous variables. We find
that divestitures increase the firm’s profitability but do not alter its scale of operations,
while the effect of privatization depends on the resulting ownership structure –
sometimes improving performance and sometimes bringing about decline. The
effects of privatization are thus more nuanced than suggested in earlier studies.
Methodologically, our study provides evidence that it is important to control for
changes in ownership when analyzing divestitures and to control for endogeneity,
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Corporate divestitures (including asset sales, spin-offs, breakups and carve-outs)
play an important part in advanced market economies and they have been widely
researched in the literature. In this paper, we use a new firm-level dataset from a
model transition economy (the Czech Republic) to estimate the respective effects
of divestitures and privatization on corporate performance. The dataset is unique
in that we know the identity of firms and observe values of indicators of corporate
performance for the divested units (representing all parts of the parent company) both
before and after the divestiture by the parent firm. Since we also have the corresponding
data for firms that did not experience any divestitures, we can carry out an analysis
that has not been performed in either the advanced or emerging market context
before. Moreover, since we have data for variables from the pre-transition
period when central planners exogenously set the values of firm-level variables, we
can construct relatively credible instrumental variables (IVs) to control for endogeneity
of divestitures and changes in ownership. We thus provide evidence on the
performance effect of divestitures and privatization that could not be carried out
before. We find that divestitures increase the firm’s profitability but do not alter its
scale of operations, while the effect of privatization depends on the resulting ownership
structure – sometimes improving and sometimes worsening the firm’s performance.
The existing literature analyzes divestitures from a number of angles. Hausman,
Tardiff and Belinfante (1993) show in the US context that the breakup of a nation-
wide telephone company brought about opportunity for gains in economic efficiency,
while Slade (1998) examines the efficiency effects of divestiture of a large number
of breweries in the UK. There is evidence that parent companies experience positive
cumulative abnormal excess returns at the announcement of a spin-off (for example,
Hite and Owers, 1983; Miles and Rosenfeld, 1983; Schipper and Smith, 1983) and
that both the spun-off units and parent firms have positive abnormal returns after
the spin-off and experience significantly more takeovers than similar firms with no
spin-offs (Cusatis, Miles and Woolridge, 1993). Daley, Mehrotra and Sivakumar
(1997) and Woo, Willard and Daellenbach (1992) show that spin-offs record
improvements in operating performance, while John and Ofek (1995) show that
divestiture-driven improvement in operating performance occurs primarily in
firms that increase their focus. Similarly, with respect to the corporate focus
hypothesis, Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) find that after divestiture parent companies
improve internal allocation of capital and increase their rate of investment. Overall,
the literature suggests that in the advanced economies divestitures increase value
and improve performance, but also have important distributional effects.
From the methodological standpoint, the literature has limitations that represent
a challenge for ongoing and future research. First, the existing studies treat dives-
titures as exogenous rather than using, for example, IV estimation to control for
their potential endogeneity. Second, in many studies the data do not permit
researchers to compare the performance of the divested units before and after the
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divestiture. Third, while Cusatis, Miles and Woolridge (1993) provide evidence
that changes in the structure of ownership after divestitures increase the firm’s rate
of return, the rest of the literature does not control for ownership changes that
occur with divestitures. Since the aforementioned endogeneity and omitted
variable issues may have produced biased estimates of the effects of divestitures,
the next step in the literature is to tackle these problems. In the present study, we
take on these methodological issues.
In addition to being consequential in advanced countries, divestures are also
important in the transition and emerging market economies. Divestitures in emerging
markets are also frequently observed together with privatization and the two
phenomena represent a key form of corporate restructuring as enterprises divest
themselves of divisions or literally break up into two or more units. In this context,
it may be hypothesized that divestitures and privatization improve corporate
performance as the new firms strive to gain reputation and introduce superior
governance. As the originally underdeveloped legal and institutional framework
improves in emerging market economies, divestitures and certain types of corporate
ownership may enhance performance by serving as a disciplining device for
management. The theoretical model developed by Chemmanur and Yan (2004)
is relevant in this setting because it shows how divestitures may increase the
probability of a takeover by value-improving management that enhances operating
performance after the divestiture. Similarly, evidence given by Cusatis, Miles and
Woolridge (1993) in an advanced country context that ownership structure after
divestiture affects positively the firm’s rate of return suggests that the challenge is
to estimate the respective effects of divestiture and ownership changes when
assessing post-divestiture performance.
Although divestitures constitute important phenomena in the transition and
emerging market economies, a lack of adequate data has prevented researchers
from analyzing them. An exception is Lizal, Singer and Svejnar (2001), who use
Czech data from the start of the transition to show that small and medium sized
divestitures have positive effects on productive efficiency and profitability of both
the parent companies and divested units in the year when the division occurs.
These findings need to be interpreted with caution, however, given the limited
data available at the time of this study. The authors for instance do not know the
identity of firms and have to use indirect methods to identify divestitures and link
the divested units to the parent firms. Moreover, the authors can follow the firms
only during the year of the breakup (1991) and the following year (1992). This
prevents them from evaluating the medium- and long-term effects of divestitures.
It also does not allow them to estimate the effects of privatization since it had not
yet taken place. Since we have richer data with a longer time span, we are able to
overcome these shortcomings and credibly estimate the effects of post-divestiture
restructuring and privatization.
The literature on the effects of privatization in the transition and emerging
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., 2007, Megginson and Netter, 2001, for empirical surveys). However,
most studies do not control adequately for the fact that firms are unlikely to be
assigned for privatization at random and the estimated effects may hence be biased
(see Gupta, Ham and Svejnar, 2008). In particular, Djankov and Murrell (2002)
point out that 47 percent of the studies surveyed in their paper do not control for
endogeneity or selection problems at all. From this perspective, the Czech Republic
constitutes a particularly useful laboratory for analyzing the effects of divestitures
and privatization on financial and economic performance in emerging markets.
During the late 1980s and early to mid-1990s the country had many features found
in other emerging market economies, but the variation in the values of the relevant
variables was much greater. Hence, while emerging market economies are usually
characterized by a transition from significant to less pronounced state ownership,
with divestitures being one of the mechanisms of corporate restructuring, in the
Czech Republic these processes were much more pronounced than in most other
economies. The country started in 1990 as an almost completely state-owned,
controlled and trade-protected economy, with its corporate sector being dominated
by large state-owned enterprise (SOE) conglomerates. It rapidly opened itself
to trade, liberalized prices and privatized its SOEs, so that by 1995 it was an over-
whelmingly privately owned market economy. In the process, most of the large
SOE conglomerates were broken up and the number of medium and large
industrial firms more than tripled on account of numerous divestitures, as well as
the entry of newly created firms.
The structural and institutional features observed in the emerging market
economies in general, and the Czech Republic in particular, lead us to test two
competing hypotheses with respect to divestitures and privatization:
1. Divestitures and privatization have a positive effect on the performance
of the resulting units by eliminating inefficiencies such as diseconomies
of scale of large SOEs, weak managerial incentives and information
asymmetries that existed prior to economic liberalization and reduction of
state control;
2. Divestitures and privatization have a negative effect on the performance of
the resulting units because of the weak corporate governance, waning
government coordination and regulation, unclear property rights, and
underdeveloped legal and institutional framework that exist in emerging
market economies.
With respect to privatization, we also test whether the nature of the effect
depends on the type of the new ownership structure. In particular, we are able to
distinguish the extent to which each firm is owned by an industrial (that is,
non-financial) firm, financial company, individual owner, or state, and we can
estimate the effect of different ownership patterns on corporate performance.
We find that divestitures and privatization have a number of significant but
also some insignificant effects on corporate performance. The average divestiture
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increases the firm’s profitability and scale of operations (sales), while the effect of
privatization depends on the resulting ownership structure. The overall evidence
for divestitures is consistent with our first hypothesis, namely that divestitures
have a positive effect on performance. Reducing state ownership is positive for
some performance indicators but insignificant or even negative for others.
Industrial firms as owners improve, or do not hamper, performance and in that
sense they behave consistently with our first hypothesis. Financial companies and
individuals as owners are mostly associated with no improvement and in some
cases significant declines in performance, thus providing evidence that is
consistent with the second hypothesis. The effects of privatization are hence
found to be less positive and more nuanced than has been suggested in many of
the early studies. Methodologically, we show that it is important to control for
changes in ownership when analyzing the effect of divestitures and control for
endogeneity, selection and data attrition when analyzing the effects of divestitures
and privatization.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we outline the institutional
setting underlying our analysis, stylized model and our estimation strategy. In
Section 3 we present our data, variables and the method for identifying divestitures.
Section 4 describes our estimating framework, including the IVs that we use. We
present our empirical results in Section 5 and draw conclusions in Section 6.
 
2. The institutional setting and estimation strategy
 
In this section we outline the main features of the institutional setting in which the
wave of divestitures and privatization in the Czech Republic took place and
present our strategy for estimation.
 
2.1 The institutional setting
 
The divestitures took place mostly during the privatization program that was
carried out in the first half of the 1990s under three different schemes: restitution,
small-scale privatization and large-scale privatization. The first two schemes
started in 1990 and were most important during the early years of the transition.
Large-scale privatization, by far the most important scheme, began in 1991 and was




 Small firms were usually auctioned or sold in tenders. Many
medium-sized businesses were sold in tenders or to predetermined buyers in direct
sales. Most large and many medium-sized firms were transformed into joint stock




The privatization process has been extensively described and analyzed. See for example, Filer and
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one-half of the total number of all shares of all joint stock companies was privatized
in the voucher scheme), sold in public auctions or to strategic partners, or transferred
to municipalities. The voucher scheme was part of the large-scale privatization
process and two waves of voucher privatization took place in 1992–1993 and 1993–
1994, respectively. The early post-privatization ownership structure emerged as
shares from the first and second wave were distributed in 1993 and early 1995,
respectively. During this period there was also significant post-privatization share
trading (often off the official stock market) among large shareholders.
Privatization of each enterprise was based on an officially accepted privatization
project. The management of each enterprise was obliged by law to submit a
privatization proposal, but any domestic or foreign firm, institution or individual
could present a competing privatization project. In reality, there was more than one
privatization proposal submitted for numerous enterprises. All proposals were
to be considered on an equal footing by the privatization authorities, which
worked with the investors to ensure that the final submitted proposals reflected at
least in part government objectives in terms of ownership structure and other
characteristics.
The decisions on divestitures were taken by the relevant government ministries
in conjunction with the government privatization authority. The decision for each
firm was based on the winning privatization project that outlined the proposed
framework for the divestiture(s). On average almost 9 projects were submitted per
firm (the median was 5); the projects were approved at an average rate of close to
3 per firm (the median was 2), reflecting the divestitures as well as government
objectives (see Kotrba and Svejnar, 1994). Table 1 summarizes information about
the privatization projects and shows that the impulse to privatize originated from




 Since management was required to submit
a privatization proposal, it comes as no surprise that 25 percent of all projects came
from this source. Independent bidders that wanted to privatize by purchasing (a
part of) a firm submitted two-fifths (39 percent) of all projects.
 
2.2 The estimation strategy
 
Before presenting our formal model, we note that initial conditions, the nature of
the divestiture, and the change in ownership may all affect subsequent corporate
performance. Moreover, initial conditions are also likely to influence the nature of




Privatization of each state-owned firm was decided on the basis of an officially accepted privatization
project. According to the law, all state-owned enterprises were selected either for the first or the second
privatization wave, or they were temporarily exempted. Each selected firm had to submit an official priva-
tization proposal that was usually crafted by the firm’s management under the tutelage (and responsibility)
of its sectoral ministry. Any domestic or foreign corporate body or individual was allowed to present a
competing project that was to be considered on an equal footing to the official one.
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we benefit from the fact that we can identify the parent company and the (to be)
divested units within it (that is, all the operating units of the parent company).
In view of the institutional setting, we model corporate performance as a function
of the presence or absence of a divestiture and the type of ownership structure.
Since the explanatory variables related to divestitures and ownership structure
may be endogenous, we use IVs in estimation. In particular, we use a logit equation
to model the divestiture of a company and subsequent changes in its ownership
structure, with the explanatory variables being predetermined and exogenous with
respect to the divestiture and privatization. We then use the predicted values from




 The task of finding
legitimate explanatory variables for the logit regression is not simple because
divestitures and ownership changes may be systematically related to unobserved




The main specification models corporate performance where endogenous variables are divestiture and
ownership structure. In a classic case one could estimate the main model with an appropriate set of instruments
(to instrument for endogeneity of divestiture and ownership). Alternatively, we know that this approach is
equivalent to a two-stage least squares. This means that in a first stage one would estimate separate models
for divestiture and ownership structure, and use predicted values as instruments for the main specification
in the second stage. Both approaches are identical when the least-square method is employed. However,
since divestiture and ownership are 0/1 variables we prefer to use a limited dependent variables technique
in the first stage.
Table 1. Proposers of privatization projects in the Czech Republic
Project submitted by Total Percentage (%)
Management of company 2,813 25
Management of plants 450 4
Bidders for purchase of company 4,388 39
District privatization commission 788 7
Restitution claimants 450 4
Local Government 450 4
Consulting firms 338 3
Others 1,575 14
Total 11,252 100
Notes: (i) Bidders for purchase of company are proposers of competing projects who wish to purchase the
company. (ii) Consulting firms submit projects proposing sales to other entities or applying to get a contract
for organizing a tender or auction. Total number of firms equals 2,404.
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that they are likely to satisfy the formal requirements. To address selection
bias arising from data attrition over time, we use a Heckman (1979) procedure to
estimate a selection equation and insert the resulting Mills ratio as a regressor in
the corporate performance equation.
 
3. Data, identification of divestitures, and definitions of variables
 
The data were compiled by the authors from Aspekt, a commercial database, and
from the archives of the Ministry of Privatization and the National Property Fund
of the Czech Republic. Table 2 summarizes all variables available along with the
periods, source, and accounting standards (for financial variables). The data allow
us to identify unambiguously the parent enterprises and all new units related to a
surge of divestitures that occurred in 1991–1992. Prior to voucher privatization, 44
firms were broken up into 131 new firms that subsequently entered the first wave
of the voucher scheme; these new firms received new tax identification numbers
and had the same rights to use the brand and/or trade name of the former parent
enterprise. Thus, out of the 988 firms that entered the first wave of voucher
privatization, we use these 131 firms newly created as a result of numerous dives-
titures, plus 780 firms that did not experience division and constitute our control
group. This means that there are only 77 firms (8 percent of the total) for which the
data are dubious due to legal problems associated with privatization, and we do
not include them in our sample. Finally, the set of firms that were divested from
large industrial conglomerates is a subset of the privatized firms. The decision to
privatize the divested units was taken at the same time as that of their divestment.
Hence, privatization is not nested with respect to divestiture in our sample and our
estimation is not constrained in any way.
Based on the identified ownership structure available from our data, we assign
firm ownership corresponding to the following categories of owners: the state,
industrial firm, individual owner, or financial company. We can clearly link parent
firms with divested units and have performance data and firm characteristics of all





 We use this information in constructing variables
measuring the size of the divestiture and in carrying out a difference-in-differences
(DID) analysis as a robust check of the baseline model.
For each firm in our dataset, we have detailed information derived from all the
proposed privatization projects that were submitted to the government before pri-




Under the US accounting rules, data related to sales, assets, operating profit, and number of employees
are available for subsidiaries and operating units before and after the divestitures for operating units
representing at least 5 percent of a firm’s business. It seems that the availability of these data has not been
fully exploited in the literature, perhaps because of the absence of data related to costs.
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Table 2. Variables and data sources
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 IAS stands for international accounting standards, LAS stands for local accounting standards and n.a.
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between the parent company and divested units, the privatization scheme, and
information on assets, liabilities, profit, sales, and number of employees in 1990.





important factor for our analysis. For many SOEs there were several privatization
projects submitted and their number was directly and primarily related to number
of divisions within each firm or the number of units into which a firm could be
naturally divided. Each privatization project reflected the structure of the firm,
managers’ motives, degree of investor interest, and expected future performance
of the firm. For many firms, however, a number of proposals might be submitted
to privatize a particular small asset that was not connected with the firm’s production
activity but that was in the firm’s possession (for instance, a recreational facility).
In order to avoid mixing these privatization projects with those covering principal
productive activities, we only consider projects aiming at privatizing 5 percent or
more of the enterprise’s assets. Table 3 displays pre-divestiture 1990 economic
indicators for the new units, parent firms and firms in the control group.
We also have data on the structure of share ownership among various domestic
and foreign parties as proposed in the winning privatization projects. The share
ownership variables include the share that the government intended to keep both
in the short and in the long term. Short-term government ownership reflects the
expectation that the government would be able to sell appreciated shares shortly
after privatization, while long-term government ownership indicates an expectation
of slower appreciation of the value of the privatized firm and/or its strategic
character in the economy. Parts of the shares retained by the government were also
classified as intended for restitution or future sale through an intermediary (see Table 4




The sectoral distribution of firms is summarized in Table 5. The frequency of
firms in the various sectors reveals that most firms belong to the sector of heavy
machinery, reflecting the structure of the Czech economy under the command
system. The firms in this sector were also most in need of restructuring and the
divisions of large conglomerates were the start of this process. Thus, the distribution
of the firms that underwent divisions is not uniform across sectors and we account
for this in our estimation by including industry-specific dummy variables and
dummy variables for size differences in particular sectors. We also exclude firms
from the forestry sector since they represent rather atypical examples of privatization,
often linked to political pressures due to various restitution claims.
To summarize, in analyzing corporate performance after the wave of divesti-
tures and privatization, we use economic and financial indicators for the period
1995–1996. The divestitures occurred in 1991–1992, the accompanying privatization
in 1992–1993, and the distribution of shares of the privatized firms and the major




Mean proportion of shares allocated to various owners (other than through voucher scheme) sum-up to
15.7 percent for spun-off units and 15.5 percent for the control group of firms.
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transfer of ownership rights ended in 1994 or very early 1995, we take 1995 to be
the first year after divestitures and privatization that truly reflects the new corporate
and ownership structure. Moreover, by 1995 the quality of the reported accounting
and economic data by and large reflected the international standards. Finally,
using data for both 1995 and 1996 allows us to test for time-varying effects of
divestitures and privatization. Hence, in our estimation we use data on early
corporate performance in 1990, firm divestitures in 1991–1992 and post-divestiture,
post-privatization performance in 1995 and 1996.
Table 3. Summary statistics of pre-divestiture indicators in 1990
Mean Standard 
deviation
Minimum Maximum Median Number 
of firms
Parent enterprises 44
Profit 171.1 385 −271.8 2,050.2 20.2 44
Sales 1,847.8 2,698 60.0 14,500.0 686.1 44
Employment 2,434.7 3,729 175.0 23,138.0 1334.0 44
Assets 1,930.0 8,633 47.2 57,600.0 331.1 44
Liabilities 431.9 907 2.9 5,787.4 140.8 44
Number of Divestitures 2.98 1.5 2 9 2 44
Number of Projects 8.98 12.2 1 77 5 44
Firms without divestitures 780
Profit 73.7 658 −612.8 16,700.0 5.6 778
Sales 828.4 2,840 1.5 50,800.0 213.5 779
Employment 1,156 3,049 3 49,701 402 780
Assets 313.4 779 2.2 9,391.4 105.5 780
Liabilities 232.1 821 0.1 14,400.0 53.6 717
Number of Projects* 2.96 4.4 1 41 1 780
Divested units 131
Profit 57.9 212 −267.2 1,874.4 4.7 130
Sales 620.6 1,501 6.2 13,100.0 133.9 131
Employment 818 1,901 23 17,880 294 131
Assets 648.2 4,311 15.8 49,200.0 78.1 131
Liabilities 157.0 517 0.1 5,295.1 27.7 121
Notes: *Original projects were assigned only to the master firms and to the control group. Hence no
information on the number of projects is available for divested units.
All financial indicators are expressed in million CZK. The average exchange rate in the period studied was
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Table 4. Proposed allocation of shares among privatizing parties in the 






Divested units Foreign Owner 1.15 6.75 0 51
Domestic Owner 2.15 9.52 0 52
Restitution 0.46 2.44 0 18
Fund of National 
Property (Temporary)
8.30 14.74 0 57
Fund of National 
Property (Permanent)
0.12 0.51 0 3
Sale through Intermediary 0.34 2.34 0 20
Municipality Transfer 3.21 8.20 0 67
Other 0.00 0.00 0 0
Firms without 
divestitures
Foreign Owner 1.74 9.08 0 75
Domestic Owner 4.28 14.42 0 84
Restitution 0.41 2.70 0 58
Fund of National 
Property (Temporary)
5.98 13.19 0 82
Fund of National 
Property (Permanent)
0.28 3.07 0 45
Sale through Intermediary 1.83 7.66 0 72
Municipality Transfer 0.88 2.34 0 20
Other 0.07 0.94 0 16
Full sample Foreign Owner 1.66 8.78 0 75
Domestic Owner 3.97 13.84 0 84
Restitution 0.42 2.66 0 58
Fund of National 
Property (Temporary)
6.31 13.44 0 82
Fund of National 
Property (Permanent)
0.26 2.85 0 45
Sale through Intermediary 1.62 7.16 0 72
Municipality Transfer 1.22 3.87 0 67






 The number of observations is 131 for divested units, 780 for the control group and 911 for the full
sample.
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Our data permit us to use three indicators of corporate performance in our
main model: unit labour cost measured by labour costs over sales (labour costs/
sales), operating profit over labour costs (profit/labour costs), and operating profit
per share (profit/equity). Our main analysis is hence based on a measure of
(labour) cost effectiveness and two direct measures of profitability. Finally, in our
DID analysis, which we perform as an extension reflecting a robustness check, we
are able to use sales as a measure of the scale of operation.
 
4. The estimating framework
 
We exploit the structure of our data to model the post-divestiture and post-
privatization corporate performance in 1995–1996 as a function of the presence or
absence of a divestiture and (subsequent) change in the ownership structure,
controlling for possible endogeneity of these explanatory variables. Second, as a
robust check to our baseline model, we construct a DID estimator, using the fact
that we can exactly match divested units in 1995–1996 with their predecessor
enterprise operating units in 1991 and have comparable data on one performance
indicator (sales) for both of these periods. In other words, for sales we look at
the difference in performance between 1995–1996 and 1991 as a function of a
divestiture and ownership change, controlling for possible endogeneity of the
explanatory variables. Summary statistics of performance indicators are presented
in Table 6.
Table 5. Sector distribution of firms (%)
Sector Divested units Control group Full sample
Agriculture 1.5 1.4 1.4
Heavy machinery 48.9 34.6 36.7
Light machinery 13.0 19.6 18.7
Construction 12.2 21.5 20.2
Transportation 2.3 2.4 2.4
Trade 3.1 12.1 10.8
Research and development 1.5 1.9 1.9
Services 13.0 4.0 5.3
Financial 4.6 2.4 2.7
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4.1 The main specification
 
We identify the percentage shares of pre-divestiture capital and labour that
each new unit appropriates from the parent (broken up) firm at the time of its
division. These are our indicators of the extent of each divestiture and we interact
them with the occurrence of a firm’s division (divestiture dummy). We use the
Table 6. Summary statistics of performance indicators: 1995–1996
Mean Standard 
deviation
Minimum Maximum Number 
of Firms
1995
Divested units Labour costs 96.4 0.27 1.12 2,405 91
Sales 1,067.5 5.35 1.59 50,570 91
Profit/Labour costs 0.5 1.20 −2.70 7 91
Profit/Equity 0.1 0.2 −0.3 0.9 91
Firms without 
divestitures
Labour costs 82.6 0.14 0.90 2,229 538
Sales 558.8 1.72 0.27 29,872 538
Profit/Labour costs 0.3 0.89 −2.89 7 538
Profit/Equity 0.1 0.2 −0.3 0.9 538
Full sample Labour costs 84.6 0.17 0.90 2,405 629
Sales 632.4 2.58 0.27 50,570 629
Profit/Labour costs 0.3 0.95 −2.89 7 629
Profit/Equity 0.1 0.2 −0.3 0.9 629
1996
Divested units Labour costs 112.5 0.32 4.73 2,818 86
Sales 1,210.9 6.03 2.08 55,495 86
Profit/Labour costs 0.4 1.01 −2.36 6 86
Profit/Equity 0.1 0.2 −0.3 0.9 86
Firms without 
divestitures
Labour costs 91.4 0.16 0.60 2,415 522
Sales 536.4 1.20 0.16 17,423 522
Profit/Labour costs 0.3 0.76 −2.38 6 522
Profit/Equity 0.1 0.2 −0.3 0.9 522
Full sample Labour costs 94.3 0.19 0.60 2,818 608
Sales 631.8 2.53 0.16 55,495 608
Profit/Labour costs 0.3 0.80 −2.38 6 608
Profit/Equity 0.1 0.2 −0.3 0.9 608
Notes: Labour costs and Sales are expressed in million CZK. Exchange rates at the end of 1995 and 1996
were $1 = 26.6 CZK and $1 = 27.3 CZK, respectively.
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1990 ratio of capital in each divested firm to total capital in the former parent
enterprise, dKi, and the 1990 ratio of the number of employees in each divested firm
to the total number of employees in the former parent enterprise, dLi, as explanatory
variables capturing the size of the divestiture. Both shares are to a large extent
given by the organizational structure of the parent firm before the split. In addition
to these key indicators of the extent of divestiture, we use a set of variables to
characterize the economic situation in the parent company before the divestiture.
Post-divestiture and post-privatization economic performance and ownership
structure are the other types of information that we take into account in our analysis.
Formally, we estimate the following model of corporate performance:
πi = α0Xi − α1DIVi + βOWN(DIV)i + γOWN(NoDIV)i + χdLi + δdKi + εi (1)
where index i denotes firms, πi is a measure of corporate performance of firm i after
both divestiture and privatization occurred (i.e., in 1995–1996), Xi captures the
pre-divestiture, pre-privatization (1990) economic situation in the parent firm
measured by assets, liabilities, sales, profit, and number of employees, and DIVi is a
dummy variable coded 1 if the enterprise is a divested unit and 0 if it is a firm that
did not experience division. Variables OWN(DIV)i and OWN(NoDIV)i measure the
post-privatization (1995–1996) ownership structure in companies that experienced
divestitures and those that did not, respectively, while β and γ are the associated
coefficients. Finally, εi is the error term.
4.1.1. Endogeneity of divestitures and ownership
Since divestitures and changes in ownership structure may be correlated with
firms’ unobserved characteristics, we treat the explanatory variables related to
divestitures and ownership as endogenous and apply IV estimation. The advantage
of the IV procedure over the more efficient maximum likelihood estimation is that
it is more robust and does not require numerical integration in the presence of the
dummy variable for divestitures and share variable for ownership. We use a logit
model to estimate the predicted values of the explanatory variables (divestitures
and ownership) and we employ standard non-linear two stage least squares
(Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 427–430)6 in that we use the predicted values from the logit
6 Conditions for consistency in the non-linear two stage least squares are the same as in the linear version
and require exogeneity of the IVs employed. To summarize our estimation method, we begin with
modelling corporate performance as a function of the presence or absence of a divestiture and the type of
ownership. Due to the potential endogeneity of explanatory variables, we use a logit equation to model the
divestiture of a company and subsequent changes in its ownership structure. We then use the predicted
values from the logit as instruments in our model of corporate performance. Thus, instead of using a linear
projection of the endogenous variables onto the space of exogenous variables, we use logit-model-based
predicted values constructed from exogenous variables that pass the tests as legitimate instruments.
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as instruments in the main Model (1) to obtain consistent estimates.7 In particular,
for the first stage regression we use the following logit model to estimate the
probability of a divestiture occurring:
(2)
where DIVi = 1 if company i is a divested unit and 0 otherwise, NPi refers to the
number of privatization projects submitted to the government in 1991 (more
discussion below), DEi captures how much the size of each firm deviates in 1990
from the standard in the OECD economies (discussed below), POWNi stands for
the ownership structure proposed in 1991 in the winning privatization project
(expressed as the percentage intended for each ownership type defined by categories
listed in Table 4), PPi measures the profitability of the parent firm in 1990 (Table 3),
and PTNSi represents the total number of shares per parent firm in 1990. The
effects of variables such as the firm’s distance from the mean OECD size, profit-
ability, and total number of shares may be non-linear and we therefore use a
Taylor series expansion of the second and third order to formulate a specification
that takes into account potential non-linearities (the order of expansion is denoted
by j in Equation (2)).
Finding valid IVs is always a challenge and our case is no exception. Nevertheless,
the fact that we are able to use as IVs firm-specific variables whose values were set
by planners centrally and independently of what firms would subsequently do in
a market setting, makes our IVs more likely to satisfy the orthogonality assumption
in the second stage of estimation than would the use of similar IVs in both more
and less developed market economies. For example, the planners tended to establish
and maintain very large firms, both because it was easier to control a few large
(rather than many small) firms and because of the prevailing political philosophy
of building large firms under communism. Econometrically, we find that all the
IVs described above pass the formal Sargan-Wu, Hansen J and Bassman tests of
over-identifying restrictions at the 1 percent test level and in this sense they qualify
as valid instruments.
From the first stage regression results on the divestiture occurrence, we detect
that the IVs are strongly pre-determined through time and have the intuitively
expected effects (see Table A1 in the Appendix). For example, the number of pri-
vatization projects submitted in 1991 (NPi) is naturally a good instrument since it
is unlikely to be correlated with potential omitted variables affecting performance
in 1996. There are two reasons for this lack of correlation. First, the number of
7 We have also carried out a sensitivity analysis in which we have adopted a linear probability model
instead of the logit specification. In this case we estimate a standard two stage least squares model. The
estimates from the two approaches are not materially different.
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submitted projects is highly correlated with the number of separable divisions
(units) that the parent firms had in 1990–1991 and that could be easily divested.
Hence it is the number of divisions established by planners rather than inherently
superior performance in a market economy that was the key determinant of the
number of privatization projects submitted per firm. Furthermore, given that pri-
vatization projects were submitted under the old, pre-transition regime in 1991 and
performance is measured in a market economy five years later, it is unlikely that
the 1995–1996 performance of a private firm and its management is related to the
number of privatization projects submitted to the state five years earlier.
Another instrument that we use is the variable DEi, measuring the number of
employees in a firm in 1990 minus the number of employees in a (weighted) average
firm belonging to the same industrial sector in the OECD economies at the same
period (see Kumar, Rajan and Zingales, 1999).8 We take the mean OECD firm size
as a benchmark because the transition countries declared their commitment to
move towards a standard market economy and many, including the Czech Republic,
succeeded in joining OECD soon after the start of the transition. One of the
determining factors for a divestiture is therefore likely to be the size of the firms
that emerged from the centrally planned system, relative to the size of firms in
established market (OECD) economies. Since the socialist planners preferred
large firms, the variable DEi captures well the excessive size of enterprises under
central planning relative to firm size in market economies and serves as a good
instrument.
Overall, the predictive power of the first-stage regressions is very high. Specifically,
in terms of the fraction of correct predictions for the divestment and non-divestment
categories, the fraction is 97 percent, and this value passed the standard χ 2-test for
significance of predictions at the 2 percent level.
We use the following regression to instrument the ownership structure
observed in 1995 and 1996 (OWNi):
(3)
where INDi is a set of one-digit industry dummies and APi is the average price per
share of company i in the voucher privatization scheme. PIFhi and IIhi are the
shares of company i allocated to privatization investment funds and individual
investors, respectively, during the large-scale privatization in 1992. The effects of
variables such as the firm’s total number of shares (PTNSi) and shares allocated to
the institutional (PIFhi) and individual (IIhi) investors may be non-linear, and we
8 We have used both the mean and median firm size and the results are similar. The mean and median
numbers of employees by industrial sector in OECD countries are given in Kumar, Rajan and Zingales
(1999; Table 2).
OWN NP POWN IND PTNS (AP) PIFh ,IIh
=1
3




















60 Hanousek, Kocenda and Svejnar
© 2009 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2009 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
therefore use a Taylor series expansion of the third order to take into account
potential non-linearities.9
As in the case of the divestiture Equation (2), all the instruments used in
specification Equation (3) pass the formal Sargan-Wu, Hansen and Bassman tests
at the 1 percent test level and thus qualify as valid instruments. They are strongly
pre-determined through time with intuitively expected effects and the predictive
power of the first-stage regressions is very high. The fraction of correct predictions
for the observed ownership structure ranges from 93.5 to 97.3 percent, depending
on the type of ownership, and these values passed the standard χ2-test for significance
of predictions at the 1 percent level.
The first stage regression results on ownership structure are reported in the
Appendix, Table A2. These results are of independent interest. Specifically, the role
of the state in privatized firms can be detected from the variables of the temporary and
permanent presence of the state in firms (the variable is coded as Fund of National
Property). The temporary effect of the state is positive for banks, portfolio companies,
and undistinguished foreign owners, where the presence of the state has attracted
these types of owners. The negative effect in the case of investment funds and foreign
investment companies may be viewed as if the presence of the state repelled
investment funds and foreign owners for not being able to effectively control a
firm. These effects are in line with the prolonged control of the state (via share holdings)
in numerous firms long after their privatization (see Hanousek and Kocenda, 2007).
4.1.2. Selection bias due to attrition
In estimating Equation (1), we may experience a selection bias because about 24 percent
of firms observed in 1990 do not report data for 1995–1996. The bias may be present
despite the fact that attrition occurred similarly in the groups of firms that experienced
divestitures and those that did not. We therefore use the Heckman (1979) procedure to
correct for this bias by estimating a selection equation and inserting the resulting
inverse Mills ratio into Equation (1). The selection probit equation is specified as
(4)
where Mi equals zero if company i has missing performance data in 1995–1996 and
Vi refers to the percentage of company shares sold in the voucher scheme. The
estimated coefficients from this auxiliary probit regression are available upon request.
9 The logit specification in Equation (2) resulted from the standard Heckman correction procedure. In
specification Equation (3) we can use either probit or logit. We prefer logit, since it is less sensitive to the
actual distribution of the error term. For the sake of consistency we employed both methods and found
them to yield similar results. The goodness of fit, measured by an adjusted R2, ranges from 0.09 to 0.1. Note
that goodness of fit is not an issue here because specification Equation (3) is a correction equation. In this
case poor fit could be interpreted as resulting from the fact that missing observations in Equation (1) are
randomly distributed.
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4.2 Robustness check: DID
As a robustness check to our baseline model, we carry out a DID estimation for the
one variable – sales revenue – for which we have comparable data in both 1990 and
1995–1996. In particular, for sales – a key variable capturing the scale of operations
and hence both performance and restructuring – we have comparable 1990 and
1995–1996 data on the divested units within the parent firms and on the firms that
did not experience divestitures. The problem that we face with respect to the other
dependent variables used in our baseline model is that the (command system)
variable definitions in 1990 differ dramatically from the (international) definitions
used by firms in 1995–1996.10 For sales, however, the definitions are similar and we can
employ the DID method as a robustness check to Equation (1), taking the divestiture
and privatization as the treatment variables that may alter the performance of the firm.11
Taking into account other potentially relevant variables, our specification of the
DID model is
Δπi = αΔDIVi + βΔOWN(DIV)i + γΔOWN(NoDIV)i + χdLi + δdKi + φMRi + εi (5)
where Δπi is a measure of the difference in sales between 1990 and 1995–1996,
ΔDIVi is a divestiture dummy coded 1 if the firm is a divested unit and zero
otherwise, and ΔOWN (DIV)i and ΔOWN (NoDIV)i capture the change in ownership
structure between 1990 and 1995–1996 for firms that experienced divestiture and
those that did not, respectively. In this context, the pre-divestiture, pre-privatization
ownership is 100 percent state ownership.12 Since we use the DID approach, ΔOWNi
captures the diminished share of state ownership and the increase in private ownership
as compared to the pre-privatization stage. Thus, in the case of state ownership, a
value of the variable of 0.3 stands for a 30 percent decrease in state ownership
(for example, from 100 to 70 percent). A negative coefficient on the change in state
ownership variable thus implies an improvement in performance with declining state
ownership. For private types of ownership the interpretation is analogous, with a
10 For example, unsold inventories were included as part of a firm’s profit in 1990 but not in 1995–1996, and
artificial invoicing was common in 1990 as invoiced products were included in profit and improved the
firm’s image. Thus, using profit in the DID estimation would most probably yield distorted results. In the
period after privatization (from the end of 1994 on) accounting rules conforming to the international ( IAP)
standard were already in place. They are different from those used prior to 1991 when the majority of
divestitures took place.
11 In Equation (1) we control for the 1990 values of key performance variables by including them as regressors
Xi, but we do not constrain the dependent variable to be in the form of a difference between the 1995–1996
and 1990 values.
12 We use the pre-divestiture, pre-privatization ownership structure in 1990 and the post-divestiture,
post-privatization one in 1995 and 1996. Privatization of firms within the first wave of the voucher scheme
was concluded in 1993 and 1994, but it was not until 1995 that new owners could affect ownership structure
or execute sovereign corporate governance in privatized and spun-off firms. See Hanousek, Kocenda and
Svejnar, 2007 for the post-1996 developments in privatized firms.
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positive coefficient implying that performance improves with an increase in private
ownership. In this context, coefficient β captures the interaction effect of the split and
subsequent change in ownership, while coefficient γ  gives the effect of ownership
change in a firm without a divestiture. Finally, MRi is the Mills ratio from the Heckman
correction (Equation 3) and dKi and dLi are as in the specification Equation (1).
The validity of the DID estimates may be affected by the potential endogeneity
of the treatment variables, in our case divestitures and privatization. To overcome
this problem, we use the approach and variables as defined in Equations (2) and
(3), respectively. Since shares of labour and capital interact with the process of a
firm’s division, we also instrument the capital and labour ratios. The IVs that we use
are industry-specific average dK and dL for groups of firms that did not experience
divestitures. Due to the absence of divestiture, the size of these firms can be
considered as being appropriate with respect to ratios of labour and capital in a
particular sector. Most importantly, the computed average is not correlated with
the error term in Equation (5) that considers only firms where divestiture occurred.
Furthermore, we use the series of average dK and dL for groups of all firms across
various industry sectors. This average ratio is computed for all firms within a
sector, with each firm experiencing division being consecutively omitted one at a
time so that a large set of averages is available. Omitting a firm that experienced
division eliminates potential correlation with the error term and an average
constructed this way is by definition a valid instrument. Finally, we also use one-digit
industry dummy variables as instruments.
The standard errors of the DID estimates may also be biased as a result of serial
correlation. Fortunately, in our case this is not a concern because the time dimension
of our panel data is very short and the cross-section dimension quite large. Never-
theless, to check the sensitivity of our results, we have also generated estimates
based on data that were aggregated into one observation before and one after the
treatment. The results are not materially different.
5. Empirical results
The estimated coefficients of Equation (1) are reported in Table 7. We start by
estimating the effect of the extent of a divestiture by interacting the share of labour
dL as well as the share of capital dK in the divested unit with annual dummy
variables for 1995 and 1996, respectively. This time-varying coefficient specification
generated similar 1995 and 1996 point estimates of the corresponding coefficients.
We have therefore performed F-tests to verify whether the separate effects for 1995
and 1996 could be constrained into a single coefficient for each variable. In all
cases, we have been able to accept the restricted model. In Table 7, we report
estimates from this more parsimonious specification.
As mentioned earlier, there is an important discrepancy in the divestiture
literature between the specification of Cusatis, Miles and Woolridge (1993), who
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Table 7. Effects of divestitures and changes in ownership structure on performance 
(Instrumental Variable (IV) estimates; standard errors in parentheses)






DIV (base effect) −0.009 0.9915 0.1741
(0.028) (0.460) (0.066)
dL (share of original labour force) 0.018 0.153 0.0735
(0.033) (0.164) (0.039)
dK (share of original capital) −0.5295 0.026 −0.074
(0.027) (0.247) (0.042)
Effects of ownership structure: divested units
Industrial firm −0.6931 −2.302 −0.603
(0.264) (2.408) (0.442)
Financial company 0.332 −8.2485 −1.310
(0.301) (3.808) (0.573)
Individual owner 0.111 −18.6285 −1.878
(0.669) (9.518) (1.471)
State 0.303 −8.631 −1.297
(0.558) (6.596) (1.227)
Effect of ownership structure: control group of firms with no divestitures
Industrial firm −0.451 0.853 0.7315
(0.109) (0.600) (0.235)
Financial company 0.2775 0.096 −0.098
(0.121) (0.722) (0.321)
Individual owner 0.44510 −1.794 0.016
(0.263) (1.680) (0.756)
State 0.233 −2.63810 −1.38810
(0.234) (1.507) (0.861)
Constant 0.2411 1.2011 0.290
(0.021) (0.270) (0.129)
Mills ratio 0.033 −1.225 −0.2701
(0.028) (0.282) (0.129)
Pre-split performance indicators Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.061 0.072 0.153
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.058 0.140
Number of observations 1,280 1,279 1,234
Hausman test (degrees of freedom) 102.3 (6) 48.9 (8) 422.9 (7)
Upper tail area < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01
Notes: Since after a divestiture and subsequent privatization the state reduces its share, the coefficients
associated with state ownership refer to a reduction of state ownership. The category Financial company
includes ownership by banks, privatization investment funds and financial intermediaries/brokerages.
Ownership coefficients and associated standard errors (in parentheses) are multiplied by a factor of 100 for ease
of interpretation. 1, 5 and 10 denote significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent statistical test level, respectively.
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control for ownership changes in analyzing divestitures, and the rest of the literature
that does not. To check the validity of the maintained assumption in the rest of the
literature, namely that one can ignore ownership effects, we have tested whether our
data permit us to exclude the ownership variables from the estimating equations.
The relevant F-tests indicate that specifications that exclude the ownership variables
are mis-specified. Our results therefore suggest that analyses of divestitures ought
to take into account the accompanying changes in the ownership structure.
Finally, the Hausman (1978) tests for endogeneity of divestitures and ownership
indicate that the IV method is superior to OLS in all regressions. In Tables 7 and 8
we report the IV estimates, noting that we do not have an excessive number of
instruments and that our regressions pass the test of over-identifying restrictions.
These tests suggest that the literature on divestitures needs to take into account the
fact that divestitures and ownership changes may be endogenously determined
rather than brought about by a random assignment.
The estimated coefficient on the occurrence of divestiture (DIV) in Table 7
indicates that the base effect of divestitures is insignificant for labour cost/sales,
but positive and statistically significant for profit/labour costs and profit/equity.
Holding the relative factor intensity of the divestitures constant, the base performance
effect of divestitures is positive for the two measures of profitability, but insignificant
for the unit labour cost.
The effect of divestitures on profit/equity varies significantly with both dL and
dK, the effect on labour cost/sales varies with dK only and the effect on profit/
labour cost is invariant with respect to the labour and capital intensity of the
divested unit. In particular, the effect of dL is positive and significant on profit/
equity and insignificant on labour costs/sales and profit/labour cost. The effect of
increasing the divestiture in terms of the labour share of the original parent firm is
therefore to increase or leave unaffected the divested unit’s profitability and leave
unchanged its unit labour cost.
The effect of dK on labour costs/sales is negative, suggesting that larger dives-
titures in terms of the share of capital appropriated from the parent firm are more
efficient in that they decrease the unit labour cost of the divested firm. As was the
case with dL, the effect of dK on profit/labour cost is insignificant. However, its
effect on profit/equity is negative and significant. The effect of increasing a dives-
titure’s share of parent firm’s capital is therefore to enlarge the newly emerged
firms’ (labour) cost efficiency and decrease or leave unaffected its profitability.
Given that the effects of divestitures vary in terms of the base effect and the size
of the divestiture in terms of dL and dK, it is informative to calculate the mean
effect of divestitures on each indicator of performance. When we take into account
the effect of the base (DIV) and evaluate the performance effects of divestitures at
the mean values of dL and dK, using the estimated variance–covariance matrix, we
find that the mean effects (and corresponding standard errors) are −0.010 (0.029)
for labour cost/sales, 1.011 (0.505) for profit/labour cost, and 0.170 (0.066) for
profit/equity. The three effects point in the direction of divestitures reducing costs
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Table 8. Effect of divestiture-related characteristics on performance: Difference-




DIV (base effect) 18.21310
(9.828)
dL (share of original labour force) 0.022
(0.168)
dK (share of original capital) −0.092
(0.082)






















Number of observations 1347
Hausman test (degrees of freedom) 22.238
Upper tail area < 0.01
Notes: Since we define all ownership categories in terms of a change in ownership between 1990 and 1995–
1996, the state ownership variable refers to the reduction of the state’s share while for the remaining
categories this difference reflects an increase. The category Financial company includes ownership by banks,
privatization investment funds, and financial intermediaries/brokerages. Ownership coefficients and
associated standard errors (in parentheses) are multiplied by a factor of 100 for ease of interpretation. 1, 5,
and 10 denote significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent statistical test level, respectively.
66 Hanousek, Kocenda and Svejnar
© 2009 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2009 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
and increasing profitability. However, only the two average effects on the profitability
indicators are statistically significant. This is because the statistical significance of
the base effect (DIV) dominates in the calculation of the statistical significance of
the average effect. The average divestiture therefore has a positive and statistically
significant effect on both measures of profitability, and a statistically insignificant
negative effect on the unit labour cost. Given that the average value of profit/
labour cost and profit/equity are equal to 0.317 and 0.132, respectively, the mean
effect of divestitures on the profitability of firms is large.
The effects of ownership changes on performance vary with the type of owner
and whether or not the firm is the result of a divestiture. With the ownership
coefficients and standard errors in Table 7 being multiplied by a factor of 100 for
ease of interpretation, and with dispersed ownership serving as the base with its
effect contained in the constant term, one can see that the extent of state ownership
does not much affect performance in either type of firm. The only effects of state
ownership that are statistically significant or close to being significant are the
negative effects on the two measures of profitability in firms that did not experience
divestiture. Reducing state ownership during large scale privatization thus has
limited positive effects on the profitability of firms that did not experience divestitures,
while the effect on newly emerged units is insignificant.
Ownership of firms by an industrial (i.e., non-financial) company has positive
or insignificant effects on performance, relative to dispersed ownership. Greater
ownership by an industrial company decreases labour costs/sales in both the
divested units and firms that do not experience divestitures, and it also increases
profit/equity in firms that were not divided. With other effects being insignificant,
industrial firms as new owners hence improve cost efficiency and leave unchanged
or improve profitability.
Financial companies and individuals, on the other hand, appear to be owners
that do not improve, and in several aspects reduce, efficiency. Financial companies
have a negative effect on both measures of profitability in the divested firms and also
a positive effect on unit labour cost in firms without divestment. Greater ownership
by individuals has a similarly non-positive effect, with the coefficients being mostly
insignificant, the effect on profit/labour cost being negative for divestitures and
the effect on unit labour cost being positive for firms without divestitures.
The above results, based on the IV estimation, can be contrasted with those
obtained from the standard OLS. For the sake of the completeness of our analysis,
we present these results in Table A3 in the Appendix, despite their inaccuracy. The
effects of the share of labour force and capital are reasonably similar to those
reported in Table 7 because the two variables are more or less exogenous by their
nature and are used only as control variables. The effects of divestitures and own-
ership type vary greatly from those obtained by the IV estimation and demonstrate
the urgent need to account for endogeneity of divestment and privatization.
In Table 8 we report the DID estimates that capture the effect of divestitures and
privatization on (growth of) sales. The base effect of divestitures is large (18 percent),
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positive and statistically significant at a 7 percent two-tail test level. The coefficients
on dL and dK are insignificant, indicating that the strong positive effect of divestitures
on the scale of operations (proxied by the logarithm of sales) does not vary with
the size of the divestiture. This finding broadens the support for our conclusions
based on the estimates of Equation (1) that divestitures have a positive effect on
corporate performance.
The DID effects of changes in ownership structure are varied. A greater reduction
of state ownership results in higher sales in divested units but lower sales in firms
without divestitures. In the case of divestitures, the effect of reducing state
ownership stands out against the positive and uniform effect across all other types
of ownership. In firms without divestitures, there is no significant sales effect
associated with ownership by an industrial company, but there is a negative sales
effect associated with ownership by financial companies and individuals, and a
positive effect associated with state ownership.
6. Conclusions
Our study, based on new data from a rapidly emerging market economy (Czech
Republic), suggests that divestitures and changes in ownership have a number of
significant but also some insignificant effects on the performance of firms. We
show that divestitures increase firms’ indicators of profitability and scale of
operations (sales), but do not reduce in a significant way their unit labour cost. The
performance effects of privatization depend on the resulting ownership structure
and on whether or not a firm experienced a divestiture. In particular, smaller state
ownership does not result in uniform and widespread improvements in perform-
ance. It has a weakly significant positive effect on profitability of firms without
divestitures, relative to other types of ownership, but other effects are insignificant
or mixed. Industrial (non-financial) firms as owners reduce unit labour cost and
leave unchanged or increase profitability. Greater ownership by financial companies
or individuals reduces profitability in divested firms and increases unit labour cost
and reduces sales in firms without divestment.
The overall evidence for divestitures is thus consistent with our first hypothesis,
namely that divestitures have a positive effect on performance. A positive effect of
divestiture on profitability without reducing costs can be credited to the increased
market power of the divested firms. Since the socialist planners preferred large
firms, the sizes of the firms that emerged from the centrally planned system were
considerably larger than the size of firms in the established-market economies
(OECD). The divestitures of the large SOEs into smaller units combined with their
privatization eliminated prior inefficiencies such as diseconomies of scale of large
state conglomerates, weak managerial incentives, and information asymmetries.
Divestitures also enabled firms to become more specialized and focused on their
core competence.
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The effect of privatization is more nuanced. Reducing state ownership per se is
positive for some performance indicators in the case of firms without divestitures,
but it is less so in the divested units. Industrial firms as owners improve or do not
hamper performance and in that sense they behave consistently with our first
hypothesis. Financial companies and individuals as owners are mostly associated
with no improvement and in some cases significant declines in performance, thus
providing evidence that is consistent with our second hypothesis related to waning
government controls, unclear corporate governance, and a weak market-oriented
legal framework. The effects of privatization are therefore more nuanced than was
suggested in many of the early studies.
Methodologically, our study provides evidence that it is important to (i) take
into account changes in ownership when analyzing the effect of divestitures, and
(ii) control for endogeneity, selection and data attrition when analyzing the effects
of divestitures and privatization.
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Appendix
Table A1. First stage regression results on the occurrence of divestiture (Equation 2)
Variable Coefficient Significance dP/dx
Total number of privatization projects 0.201 1 0.014
(0.047)
(Total number of privatization projects)2 −0.006 1 −0.00003
(0.002)
DEi average 0.001 1 0.0001
(0.0006)
(DEi average)2 −1e–8 −4e–9
(2e–7)
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(DEi average)3 3e–10 5 2e–12
(1e–10)
DEi median −0.001 5 −8e–5
(0.0005)
(DEi median)2 4e–6 3e–9
(2e–6)
(DEi median)3 −3e–9 5 −2e–12
(1e–10)
Foreign owner −0.007 −4e–4
(0.014)




Fund of national property (temporary) 0.009 6e–4
(0.006)
Fund of national property (permanent) −0.029 −0.002
(0.043)
Municipality transfer 0.018 0.001
(0.030)
Profit (parent) 0.248 0.017
(0.178)
[Profit (parent)]2 −0.018 −0.001
(0.028)
Sales (parent) 0.082 5 0.006
(0.039)
[Sales (parent)]2 −0.002 5 −0.0001
(0.001)
Total number of shares (billion) 1.020 1 0.071
(0.412)
[Total number of shares (billion)]2 −0.205 5 −0.014
(0.102)




Variable Coefficient Significance dP/dx





















Table A2. First stage regression results on the ownership structure (Equation 3)
Domestic owners Foreign owners












































Constant −2.201 −0.43 −15.28 5 −0.206 −3.120 −0.432 −2.049 −0.131 −4.521 −0.164 3.193 0.175 −17.51 1 −0.289




0.448 0.09 3.956 5 0.0533 1.195 0.1656 5.696 0.3653 −3.919 −0.142 −3.923 5 −0.21 8.497 5 0.14




−0.013 0.00 −0.403 −0.005 −0.607 1 −0.084 −1.948 −0.125 −0.917 −0.033 −0.770 −0.04 −0.835 10 −0.014
(0.021) (0.028) (0.019) (2.00) (0.086) (0.062) (0.047)




−0.243 −0.05 −12.449 −0.168 −0.010 −0.001 1.701 0.1091 −12.350 −0.448 0.908 0.05 −31.065 10 −0.512
(2.27) (9.96) (3.34) (7.31) (13.1) (6.5) (16.6)
Sold shares 
(millions)
−0.126 −0.02 9.999 0.1348 1.424 0.1973 −10.177 −0.653 20.107 0.73 5.716 0.312 24.416 10 0.402
(2.16) (9.37) (3.04) (6.53) (12.7) (6.28) (14.8)
Sold points 
(millions)
0.000 0.00 0.043 0.5829 0.000 5 −0.005 −0.005 −0.302 0.000 10 −0.004 0.000 5 0.003 0.131 0.216
(0.012) (0.029) (0.019) (0.0479) (0.062) (0.025) (0.040)
(0.0102) (0.0279) (0.0102) (0.0267) (0.0779) (0.0265) (0.875)
Foreign 
owner
−0.055 −0.01 0 −0.033 −0.005 0  0 0 0
(0.0208) (0.0254)  
Domestic 
owner
0.022 0.00 0.132 1 0.002 −0.028 10 −0.004 −0.00361 0 0.021 0.001 −0.0802 1 −0 0.0123 0
(0.009) (0.0378) (0.0166) (0.0179) (0.0197) (0.0185) (0.0349)
Restitution 0.073 0.01 0.275 0.004 −0.013 −0.002 −0.142 −0.009 −0.389 −0.014 0.0723 0.004 0


























Fund of national 
property 
(temporary)
−0.011 0.00 0.0706 5 0.001 −0.025 10 −0.003 −0.0105 −0.001 0.0306 10 0.001 −0.028 5 −0 0.0574 5 0.001
(0.009) (0.0293) (0.0148) (0.019) (0.0162) (0.0127) (0.0246)
Fund of national 
property 
(permanent)
0.011 0.00 0 −0.061 −0.008 −0.0798 −0.005 0.109 0.004 0 0
(0.073) (0.143) (0.139) (0.0843)
Sale through 
intermediary
0.008 0.00 −0.0061 0 0.025 10 0.003 −0.00773 0 0 −0.0498 1 −0 0.0338 0.001
(0.011) (0.0667) (0.0147) (0.0227) (0.0149) (0.0474)
Municipality 
transfer
−0.126 −0.03 −0.0073 0 −0.011 −0.002 −0.0835 −0.005 0.0006 0 −0.0427 5 −0 0.0838 5 0.001
(0.035) (0.123) (0.02) (0.0705) (0.0406) (0.019) (0.0383)
Other 0.041 0.01 0 −0.048 −0.007 −0.165 5 −0.011 0.0193 0.001 −0.0684 1 −0 −0.171 −0.003
(0.014) (0.0342) (0.0692) (0.0471) (0.0232) (0.187)
Privatized in 
voucher scheme
0.002 0.00 0.091 1 0.001 0.032 5 0.004 0.0178 0.001 0.0274 0.001 −0.0948 1 −0.01 0.123 1 0.002
(0.009) (0.0324) (0.0143) (0.02) (0.0206) (0.0153) (0.0437)
Share average 
price in voucher 
scheme
−0.001 0.00 0.00965 0 0.017 5 0.002 −0.0117 −0.001 0.0402 10 0.001 0.00588 0 0.0261 0
(0.00445) (0.0142) (0.00842) (0.0119) (0.0222) (0.0104) (0.0179)
[Share average 
price in voucher 
scheme]2
0.000 0.00 8.9E–06 0 0.000 0 4.39E–06 0 −0.0002 10 0 −2.9E–05 0 2.95E–06 0




0.026 0.01 0.0844 1 0.001 0.016 0.002 −0.0137 −0.001 −0.0786 −0.003 −0.0126 −0 −1.247 −0.021
(0.0102) (0.0279) (0.0102) (0.0267) (0.0779) (0.0265) (0.875)
Pre-privatization 
characteristics
Yes yes yes  yes yes  yes  yes  
R2 (scaled) 0.175 1 0.464 1 0.219  1  0.157  1  0.142  1  0.386  1  0.325  1  
Domestic owners Foreign owners











































Table A2. (cont) First stage regression results on the ownership structure (Equation 3)
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Table A3. Inaccurate effects of divestitures and changes in ownership structure on 
performance (Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates; standard errors in parentheses)







DIV (base effect) −0.011 −0.002 −0.0551
(0.012) (0.325) (0.054)
dL (share of original labour force) 0.022 0.216 0.0765
(0.037) (0.495) (0.079)
dK (share of original capital) −0.5225 0.324 0.153
(0.031) (0.580) (0.146)
Effects of ownership structure: divested units
Industrial firm −0.2151 0.033 −0.068
(0.082) (1.080) (0.101)
Financial company 0.088 7.5741 0.5301
(0.172) (2.531) (0.146)
Individual owner 0.018 −0.743 −0.034
(0.103) (1.020) (0.106)
State 0.089 −1.599 0.299
(0.173) (3.142) (201)
Effect of ownership structure: control group of firms with no divestitures
Industrial firm −0.0811 1.600 0.059
(0.019) (1.247) (0.061)
Financial company 0.018 0.127 0.002
(0.025) (1.476) (0.042)
Individual owner 0.011 −10.024 0.104
(0.052) (10.770) (0.161)
State 0.154 −22.172 0.142
(0.126) (24.587) (0.170)
Constant 0.2321 1.59710 0.2071
(0.012) (0.904) (0.077)
Mills ratio 0.033 −2.2045 −0.2131
(0.028) (1.113) (0.092)
Pre-split performance indicators Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.064 0.151
Number of observations 1,280 1,279 1,234
Notes: Since after a divestiture and subsequent privatization the state reduces its share, the coefficients
associated with state ownership refer to a reduction of state ownership. The category financial company includes
ownership by banks, privatization investment funds and financial intermediaries/brokerages. Ownership
coefficients and associated standard errors (in parentheses) are multiplied by a factor of 100 for ease of
interpretation. 1, 5 and 10 denote significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, 10 percent statistical test level, respectively.
